



Huck-ju Kwon | Seoul National University 
HARVARD-YENCHING  
INSTITUTE WORKING 
PAPER SERIES  
TRANSITION TO THE ‘UNIVERSAL 
WELFARE STATE’: 
THE CHANGING MEANING OF THE  






Transition to the ‘Universal Welfare State’:  




(Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University &  
Harvard Yenching Institute) 
 
Please do not cite the draft without author’s permission. Kwon ⓒ 
 
Abstract 
Over the last fifty years, the welfare state in Korea has evolved from a minimal structure of welfare 
programmes to a comprehensive set of institutions and policies for social protection. This paper traces 
changes in understandings of the welfare state articulated by policy makers, examining their political 
strategies to lead the Korean society to the welfare state. The concept of the welfare state has changed 
its meaning according to their political strategies at different conjunctures, while the aspiration for the 
welfare state as an ideal state of affairs, where a certain level of well-being is guaranteed for all by the 
state, remains strong if not stronger than before. For the welfare state is an essential component of 








When my book, The Welfare State in Korea: the Politics of Legitimation, was published in 
the late 1990s (Kwon, 1999), many of my fellow Korean academics and students asked me 
the same question: ‘Do you think Korea is a welfare state?’ My response was, ‘Korea is not a 
welfare state, but the book examines the welfare state in Korea.’1 People were a little 
confused at this answer. It was because the concept of the welfare state had at least two 
different meanings. First, in Korean language, the welfare state (Pokjikukga) is a nation-state 
that provides a comprehensive range of social protection to its citizens, a kind of ideal state of 
affairs. At the time of the book’s publication, the Asian economic crisis that began in 1997–
98 had taken its toll. Many Korean citizens were not only hard hit by the economic downturn, 
but those who escaped it also felt vulnerable due to the lack of social protection. Most Korean 
people did not consider Korea as a welfare state in the sense described above. Rather, people 
felt that Korea fell far short of the mark and should strive further to become a welfare state as 
a sort of ‘good society’, which is still the language very much used every day in Korean 
media and the general public.  
Secondly, the welfare state is understood as a set of public institutions and policies 
that aim to provide social protection to citizens. The state (Kukga) in Korean language is a 
collection of public institutions and policies, and thus the welfare state is a set of public 
institutions and policies that aim to provide social protection for citizens.
2
 This second 
understanding of the welfare state is more analytical than the first one. My book in fact 
adopts this second definition of the welfare state, as it enables me to examine those public 
institutions and policies for social protection, even though they may not be able to provide 
comprehensive social protection to citizens. 
Fifteen years on after the Asian economic crisis, the Korean society was 
engaged in a debate on the ‘universal’ welfare state. During the presidential election that took 
place in December 2012, two leading candidates from the major political parties made it clear 
                                                     
1
 Throughout this chapter, Korea refers to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) not to Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). 
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 In fact, I did not explicitly define the welfare state in the book, The Welfare State in Korea (1999). I 
did it in the edited book, Transforming the Developmental Welfare State in East Asia (2005). 
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that they would pursue policies to establish some sorts of the ‘universal’ welfare state once 
they were elected. The eventual winner, President Park Geunhye, promised that her 
government would make people happy with the welfare state, which could meet all the 
different demands of citizens from all walks of life. In order to achieve that goal, she would 
establish a welfare state that could address various welfare needs of citizens located at the 
different points of the life course.
3
 The opposition party, the Democratic Party, made more 
specific promises about the ‘universal’ welfare state. It placed a great deal of emphasis on 
‘free’ social programmes such as free healthcare and childcare.4 It also made it clear that its 
social policy programmes would reduce income inequality. Following the debates on the 
‘universal’ welfare state during the presidential election, it seems clear to me that, in Korea, 
there is such a thing that can be called the welfare state. Nevertheless, it is a ‘selective’ 
welfare state as opposed to a ‘universal’ welfare state and, the presidential candidates 
believed, Korea should move towards a ‘universal’ welfare state. But what does it mean by a 
‘universal’ welfare state, exactly?  
These two examples show that, like in other countries analysed in this book, the 
term ‘welfare state’ has multiple meanings in Korea. Over the last fifty years, during which it 
made a rapid transition from a poor, war-torn society to an affluent industrialised country, 
Korea has evolved from having a minimal structure of welfare programmes to a 
comprehensive set of institutions and policies for social protection. This chapter will argue 
that, in Korea, the concept of welfare state has referred to at least two understandings: first, 
an ideal state of affairs the country should reach, as it strives to become a modern and 
advanced society; and, secondly, a set of public institutions aiming for social protection, a 
simple and analytical notion of institutions. Over the last fifty years, the concept of the 
welfare state has changed its meaning according to political strategies to establish the welfare 
state at different conjunctures. In this chapter, I will argue that the understandings of the 
welfare state moved closer toward the second meaning while the aspiration for the welfare 
state as an ideal state of affairs, where a certain level of well-being is guaranteed by the state, 
remains strong if not stronger than before. I would argue that the welfare state is one of the 
essential components of Korea’s modernization project which goes beyond the left and right 
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 It became one of four overall policy orientations of the government. 
www.president.go.kr/assignment02.php  
4
 Democratic Party’s Presidential Manifesto (www. http://minjoo.kr/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/) 
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divide of the Korean politics. This chapter will focus on understandings of the welfare state 
articulated by policy makers and academics, examining their political strategies to lead the 
Korean society to the welfare state.   
 
Two meanings of ‘welfare state’ in the context of economic development 
In the last five decades when Korea managed to achieve a remarkable social and economic 
transformation, economic development was the top priority for virtually all incumbent 
governments. For this reason, the understanding of the welfare state has been shaped by its 
relationship to economic development. In this section, I will look into two significant 
historical conjunctures that shaped the meanings of the welfare state in relation to the 
political strategies for economic development: the first took place in the early 1960s, soon 
after the military coup in 1961, and, the second, in the late 1990s, after the 1997 Asian 
economic crisis.  
Government efforts for economic development began in the mid-1950s, when 
the Korean War ended in a stalemate, but it was the military government established by the 
1961 coup d’état that launched a substantial economic development initiative and 
implemented it in earnest. Its undisputed leader, Park Chung Hee (in office 1961-1979), was 
Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction as it launched the First Five 
Year Economic Development Plan to revitalise the country. In a 1963 speech, Park gave his 
idea of development a clear purpose, project, and priority (Park, 1963: : 173): ‘I want to 
emphasise and reemphasise that the key factor of the May 16 Military Revolution was in 
effect an industrial revolution in Korea. Since the primary objective of the revolution was to 
achieve a national renaissance, the revolution envisaged political, social and cultural reforms 
as well. My chief concern, however, was economic revolution.’ This speech clearly set out 
the policy priority of the government, which could be summarized as an ‘economy-first’ 
policy (Park, 1963: : 186). Nevertheless, economic development was not the only policy goal 
on which the military government focused, as it also recognised the need to address social 
welfare. Park believed that the Korean government should ‘provide all the people in this 
country with decent lives as human beings’ (Park, 1962: : 224). Although he made it clear 
that if would be possible only after the achievement of the overall growth of the economy, he 
did not just wait. 
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In 1962, in fact, Park asked his cabinet to prepare policy proposal for social 
policy programmes (Seo, 1962), and then Park announced his intention to introduce social 
policy programmes in his New Year speech (Seo, 1962). The task to prepare the policy 
proposal was handed to the Committee for Social Security (CSS) (Ministry of Labour, 1981). 
The CSS was an informal study group that included bureaucrats from the Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs, doctors, and academics who were concerned with the idea of introducing 
social security programmes in Korea. Although the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs had 
long planned to give this informal group official status, the move to accommodate the CSS as 
an official bureau of research was quickly completed, as the military government needed to 
set up a substantial plan for social welfare.  
After only six months of study, the CSS formulated policy proposals regarding 
unemployment insurance, health insurance, and industrial accident insurance. The CSS 
reported the proposals to the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction, the cabinet of the 
government, for approval. Their recommendation for the industrial accident insurance came 
through the deliberation process without much difficulty, since the military government was 
about to embark on an ambitious economic development plan (Son, 1981). The military 
clearly saw the need for industrial accident insurance, but the proposals for unemployment 
insurance and health insurance were rejected by the Supreme Council, because they thought 
that they would impose an excessive financial burden on people. More importantly, the 
Supreme Council saw these proposals for health and unemployment insurance programmes 
as rather idealistic (Choe, 1991). 
The policy makers assumed that the Korean society was not ready to adopt such 
programmes, which, they thought, only developed societies could afford. Here it is necessary 
to pay special attention to the understanding of social welfare among CSS members, who 
were true pioneers in that field. Some of the academics who participated in the CSS had 
studied social policy in Europe and Japan (Son, 1981; Woo, 2008).
5
 For them, it was a 
genuine ‘mission’ to introduce social insurance programmes in Korea. The bureaucrats of the 
CSS who participated from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs also recognised the 
need for social insurance. This was why they first started an informal study group seeking to 
understand the mechanism of social insurance and explored the possibility of introducing 
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 Some of CSS members studied in France and Japan, and others had progressive political orientation 
before they joined the CSS (Woo 2008).  
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them in Korea. Nevertheless, they did not use the language of ‘welfare state’. At the time, 
even for them, perhaps the idea of establishing a welfare state seemed too idealistic.  
As Park Chung Hee won presidential election in 1963, which was carried out in 
free and competitive manner, the Korean government now had a democratic outfit. His 
government vigorously pursued economic development as its top priority. Throughout the 
1970s, the Park government managed to achieve economic development, and further social 
insurance programmes subsequently introduced, such as health insurance and public 
pensions, were structured in such a way that they could foster economic development policy 
(Kwon, 1999). For instance, public health insurance, introduced in 1977, only covered 
workers in large-scale industrial workplaces with more than 500 employees, while the poor 
and other vulnerable groups were excluded from coverage. Industrial workers received the 
coverage because they were considered to be of strategic importance for economic 
development. Such policy logic driven by economic consideration gave a distinctive 
characteristic to the welfare regime in Korea, which I refer to as a ‘developmental’ welfare 
state (Kwon, 2005). 
However, in Korea, other policy paradigms have emerged alongside the 
traditionally dominant ‘economy-first’ approach. Let us move fast-forward to the late 1990s. 
In December 1997, in the wake of the Asian economic crisis, long-time opposition leader 
Kim Dae-jung was elected to the presidency. The Kim government launched the ‘productive’ 
welfare initiative, which initially came to the fore as a response to the economic crisis but 
later became a government policy priority. The weaknesses of the developmental welfare 
state in Korea (based on a narrowly growth-focused system only providing social protection 
to those strategic for economic development, combined with a heavy reliance on family or 
informal networks for social support) were painfully exposed during the economic crisis of 
1997–98 (Goodman et al., 1998; Kwon, 2001). Faced with a severe economic crisis, the 
newly formed Kim government convened a tripartite committee, in which the government, 
business, and labour were able to reach a social consensus for reform. The government 
quickly implemented social policy reforms to enhance social protection for vulnerable 
citizens. This swift response was also related to economic structural adjustment and the 
government’s related plan to implement labour market reform. To facilitate this process, the 
Kim government saw the need for social protection programmes for the unemployed and the 
poor. The Employment Insurance Programme, consisting of unemployment benefits and 
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training schemes, was extended and strengthened in terms of coverage and benefits. The 
government also strengthened benefits of the public assistance programme for the poor. 
Together with the Employment Insurance Programme, it placed a strong emphasis on training 
and workfare in order to help the unemployed and low-income families to re-enter the labour 
market. The government intended to use these welfare initiatives to bring the Korean 
economy through structural transformation leading to a more high-tech orientation. With this 
approach, the concept of social policy, which once was understood in terms of trade-off in 
relation to economic policy, became an essential part of economic policy (Kwon, 2005). 
The Kim government continued making social protection its main policy 
priority. In his 2000 Independence Day address, President Kim promised that his government 
would launch a ‘productive’ welfare initiative (Presidential Office, 2000). The president 
made it clear that his government would serve the welfare needs of the people while meeting 
the demands for economic development. It was a significant break from the past policy 
paradigm, which saw social policy as a mere instrument for economic consideration. The 
Kim government initiative put social welfare as a key policy priority on par with economic 
development, although the concept of ‘productive’ welfare was still in use. Following this 
initiative, the government integrated the fragmented National Health Insurance into the new 
National Health Insurance Corporation, a single national agency for health insurance 
administration and finance. This restructuring of National Health Insurance would enhance 
the redistributive effects of public health insurance by pooling together all income groups 
into a single risk pool. More importantly, in 2000, the Kim government introduced the 
Minimum Living Standard Guarantee, which was based on the idea of social rights and 
replaced the stringent means-tested public assistance programme. The changes in policy 
worked to extend social protection to the poor and the vulnerable.  
Figure 1 shows public spending on social protection in Korea over the decade 
after the Asian economic crisis. Since the Kim years (1998–2003), public spending on social 
protection has increased steadily. Spending through social insurance as well as the 
government spending has increased rapidly as the National Pension Programme, the 
Employment Insurance Programme, and National Health Insurance have matured. The Long-
term Care Insurance which was also introduced in 2008 contributed the increase in social 
spending. In short, there is a rather wide range of social insurance programmes and income 
support programmes in place in the Korean society. 
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Figure 1. Public Spending on Social Protection in Korea 
 
Source: http://kosis.kr/ups/ups_01List01.jsp?grp_no=&pubcode=KP&type=F (social 
indicators in Korea); Ministry of Health and Welfare, Social expenditure in Korea. 
 
Because of the steady extension of the existing programmes and introduction of the new 
programmes to the system, there was a significant change in the language of the welfare state. 
Here it is necessary to follow how social policy scholars used the concept of welfare state, as 
they are the first group of people to reflect such changes in the discourse. As mentioned 
above, in the late 1990s, I used the concept of welfare state to refer to the set of public 
institutions and policies for social protection before (Kwon, 1999), but the term ‘welfare 
state’ to denote such public institutions and policies for social protection was not used very 
often. Once the Kim government extended existing social policies and introduced new 
programmes in the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholars began to use the term of the ‘welfare 
state’ as an analytical terms rather than as an ideal state of affairs.  
For instance, in a paper published in the book titled Debates on the Nature of the 
Welfare State in Korea (Kim, 2002), Seong (2002) used the term of the welfare state to refer 
to social welfare institutions and policies. The title of the paper, which was written in Korean, 
can be translated as ‘Democratic consolidation and the development of the welfare state: 
Comparison between the Kim Young Sam and the Kim Dae-jung governments’. It compared 
social policy under two presidents in the late 1990s. Seong’s paper maintained that there was 
a strong growth in the welfare state in Korea under Kim Dae-jung government (Seong, 2002). 
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Later on, Jeong (2009) edited a new volume with the same title as Kim’s 2002 book (Debates 
on the Nature of the Welfare State in Korea II). In the 2009 volume, there were a number of 
chapters using the concept of welfare state as analytical concept, although some of chapters 
used the welfare state as the ideal state of affairs, in which a certain level of well-being is 
guaranteed by the state. In other words, the 2009 book featured both definitions of the 
welfare state. 
This section has showed that the welfare state as an ideal had long existed in 
Korea and that some social policy measures were introduced when Korea began to embark on 
economic development under the rationale of ‘economy first’. In contrast, today, the growing 
currency of the welfare state as an analytical term is a reflection of the development of the 
welfare state in Korea. More specifically, there is a comprehensive set of social policies and 
programmes in Korea that can be called a ‘welfare state’. This reality is not just related to the 
expansion of social programs but also to their changing nature. Until recently, the welfare 
state gradually moved from a selective to a more inclusive developmental state, although it 




From development to the ‘universal’ welfare state 
In this section, I will explore the way in which the concept of ‘universal’ welfare state has 
emerged as the embodiment for a ‘good society’, and its impact on social policy. From the 
1960s until the 1980s, although it was seen as a remote possibility at the time, the welfare 
state as an ideal state of affairs had been an aspiration for the Korean society. From the 1980s 
until now, in two occasions, explicit political commitments have been made to realise such an 
aspiration. The first commitment came about in the early 1980s, when the Chun Doo-whan 
government (in office 1980-1987) launched a welfare state project. The catchphrase used by 
the government at that time was, ‘Let’s Construct Welfare State’ (Pokchi Kukka Konsôl 
Hacha). The second was in the leading up to the 2012 presidential campaign when the 
‘universal’ welfare state became one of the main policy issues for political parties. The 
concept of welfare state as an aspiration for a society where a high level of well-being is 
guaranteed has been further articulated by the new concept of the ‘universal’ welfare state 
(‘Popyeonjôk’ Pokchi Kukka). Why did the Chun government put the welfare project first for 
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 Some argue that the Korean welfare state became more liberal under the Kim government. 
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their political programme and what impact did it produce? What is the rationale to introduce 
a new notion of the universal welfare state? What are the implications for social policy? 
The first political project for the welfare state began with the Chun government. 
In 1979, President Park was assassinated by his security chief, and subsequent political 
events took place in a highly uncertain situation. No one was sure whether such a catastrophic 
event would lead to democratisation or further deterioration into authoritarian politics. In the 
end, another military general, General Chun, who was in charge of investigation of the 
assassination, took over power through a palace coup d’état. Chun forcefully quelled political 
competition from other civilian politicians and made himself President through a rubber 
stamp election. What was very interesting was that he put out a manifesto on social welfare to 
seek support from the Korean people. He adopted the political catch phrase, ‘Let’s Construct 
Welfare State’ (Pokchi Kukka Konsôl Hacha) (Kwon, 1999). His determined efforts to 
emphasise social welfare was a deliberate move to distance himself from the previous 
government; President Park and his government had prioritized economic growth over social 
welfare, although some social programmes had been introduced during his incumbency. In 
terms of economic policy, it is important to note that Chun government’s main priority was 
stabilization rather than growth, another contrast to the previous government policy (Haggard 
and Moon, 1990). 
With the welfare state project, the Chun government tried to convey the 
political message to the public that his government was serious about achieving one of the 
ideals of the Korean society: the welfare state, a term epitomizing a good society. In terms of 
practical programmes for implementation to realize such policy commitment, the Chun 
government decided to strengthen the public assistance programme. The programme was 
introduced in 1965 and was a means-tested policy providing meagre benefits to the very poor. 
As Table 1 shows, the number of the recipients of that public assistant programme declined 
throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. Rapid economic development in this period raised the 
level of the income among low-income households, and reduced the number of poor people 
in Korea. Considering that only very poor people who did not have enough to survive on their 
own were eligible for assistance, the reduction in the number of recipients was hardly 
surprising. In 1980, the Chun government raised the income ceiling of the means-test for 
public assistance and, as a consequence, the number of recipients increased sharply (Ko, 
1990). Apart from the strengthening the public assistance programme, the Chun government 
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did not continue efforts into bolstering social programmes. His government, however, 
pursued a stabilisation policy, carrying out structural reform of major industries and keeping 
government spending in check (Haggard and Moon, 1990). 
 
 










Per cent of the 
total population 
1965 288 72 3563 13.66 
1970 306 63 2116 7.71 
1975 375 52 904 3.77 
1980 339 47 1500 4.95 
1985 282 63 1928 5.52 
1990 340 81 1835 5.26 
Source: Korea Statistical Yearbook (1966, 1986, 1990) 
 
According to Haggard and Moon (1990), within the Chun government, the welfare initiative 
was promoted by people with a military background, and the stabilisation policy was backed 
by the bureaucrats from the Board of Economic Planning and Ministry of Finance. There was 
inevitable tension between the welfare initiative and economic stabilization policy. Once 
Chun consolidated his power, he was inclined to rely more on bureaucrats than on military 
personnel for his economic and social policy. The welfare manifesto became marginalised 
while economic stabilisation remained at the fore of the government’s overall policy 
direction. In the end, the ‘welfare state’ in the broad sense of the term remained an elusive 
ideal for the Korean public. 
In the previous section, I discussed the shift in the meaning of the welfare state 
following the productive welfare initiative by the Kim government. If the concept of welfare 
state now refers to social welfare institutions and policies, how could one still describe the 
welfare state as an ideal, as in the broader definition of the concept discussed above? In 
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recent years, the concept of the ‘universal welfare state’ appeared in the public debate to refer 
to such an ideal welfare state.  
The concept of the ‘universal welfare state’ appeared for the first time in 
Korean politics during the local election for the Educational Authorities in 2010. Kim Sang-
gon, one of the candidates for the Educational Authority in the Kyunggi Province 
surrounding the Seoul metropolitan area promised that he would provide all children in 
primary schools with free school lunch. At the time of the election, only children of poor 
households were exempt from paying for school lunch while other pupils needed to pay a 
monthly fee for lunch. Candidate Kim promised that all children would have free lunch 
regardless of the level of family income. This electoral pledge brought about a wide range of 
responses from politicians and the public in general. Kim Sang-gon explained his idea in the 
following statement:
7
 ‘… in the advanced capitalist society it is natural that basic welfare 
should be provided universally to the public. As Korea is now preparing to enter the group of 
advanced societies, basic welfare should be guaranteed for everyone no matter who gets 
political power.’ While there were strong criticisms toward the statement in the political 
establishment, the public initially received it very well. The general public’s embrace of his 
message was an unexpected response, since people in the establishment, politics, government 
or media still felt it was premature for Korea to establish a welfare state comparable to 
Western European countries (Koh, 2012). To take advantage of the situation, other candidates 
in the election jumped on the bandwagon and embraced the idea of universal social policy. 
For instance, Kwak Nohyun, candidate for the Educational Authority for Seoul metropolitan 
area, argued that welfare is not only for the poor:
8
 ‘… in the school, universal welfare should 
be guaranteed. There should be children stigmatized. … Children of rich households should 
be eligible. … Universal welfare should be for everyone.’ Although it was not certain 
whether their promise for free school lunches for everyone influenced election results, these 
two candidates who supported universal welfare won their seats in the end.  
With their eyes on the upcoming general election in April 2012, the main 
opposition party, the Democratic Party, went on to say that their government would make 
health care free, removing patient co-payments for National Health Insurance. The 
Democratic Party also promised that they would halve university fees. The Democratic Party 
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 Interview with Kim Sangon, Hangyore Daily, April 2010. 
8
 Interview with Kwak Nohyun, Poli News, May 2010. 
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placed strong emphasis on the concept of ‘free’ welfare provision.9 During the general 
election, such efforts were not, however, received very well by the public. It was seen as a 
fiscally unsustainable commitment grounded in populism. The Democratic Party was accused 
of reckless by the main stream media. Faced with such a strong backlash, the Democratic 
Party shifted its policy emphasis from ‘free’ to ‘universal’ welfare, but it was not clear what 
‘universal’ welfare would mean, if not free.  
One of the underlying reasons the Democratic Party was so desperate about 
welfare policy was that the leading political figure of the governing party at the time, Park 
Geunhye, gave social welfare high policy priority. It was a different policy stance from her 
party which had maintained neo-liberal position. She wanted to project herself as a national 
leader representing the whole population rather than a particular political tendency. She 
maintained that every citizen would need social supports from the state, not only the poor. 
She further argued that welfare benefits should be tailored to each citizen’s needs, varying 
according to their position in the life cycle. It was a bold move, since the incumbent 
government under President Lee Myungbak (in office 2008-2013) did not consider welfare a 
high priority.  
During the presidential election in 2012, both major parties, the governing 
Saenuri Party and the opposition Democratic Party, promised that they would pursue a 
‘universal’ welfare state once they were elected. However, the two political parties were not 
give a clear definitions for ‘universal’ welfare state. First, this concept may mean that the 
state would provide citizens with welfare provisions for free. In other words, social services 
are provided for free at the point of delivery. Although the Democratic Party withdrew their 
commitment for free health care, both major parties supported free childcare for family with 
children under five. Such a reform would increase fiscal expenditures, which in turn would 
require tax increases, but the governing party was not very clear about such potential 
increases, while the opposition party was willing to increase it.  
Second, to establish a ‘universal’ welfare state in Korea, it would be necessary 
to bring in those who are currently excluded from social insurance coverage. As shown in 
Table 2, social insurance programmes cover less than half of the population in the relevant 
categories. For instance, only 42.5% of working-age people are covered by public pension 
programmes such as the National Pension Programmes and Government Employees Pension 
                                                     
9
 21 March 2012, the Maeil Economy.  
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Programmes. Furthermore, only 41.2% of workers are covered by the employment insurance 
programme. This high level of non-coverage means that a large segment of the population 
facing income losses is not entitled to any state protection. Regarding the Minimum Living 
Standard Guarantee, only 46.4% of poor people receive income support, as the others are not 
entitled because they have family members who are responsible for supporting them. In a 
nutshell, the ‘welfare state’ in Korea is still far from ‘universal’, as it does not cover all the 
relevant risk categories for the entire population. Despite all the talk about universality, it is 
not clear how the incumbent Park government would bring those outside the ‘welfare state’ 
into the main fold of social insurance. 
 
Table 2 The Coverage of social Insurance Programme in 2012 
Social Programmes Categories People covered by the 
programmes 
People not covered by 
the programmes 
Public Pensions Working-age people 42.5% (Contributors 










Employed 41.2% (Regular 
employees and some 
of short-term contract 
workers) 
58.8% (Part-time 












People with family 
members responsible 
for support) 
     
Third, in order to claim that Korea has established a ‘universal’ welfare state, in 
which citizens are guaranteed a decent level of well-being, a sort of ideal state of affairs that 
used to be implicit in ‘welfare state’, there would have to be a sharp increase in the amounts 
of public provision. For instance, old-age pensions, which are provided to people over age 70, 
are only one fifth of the average wage of working people and should be raised to a higher 
level in order to be considered genuinely universal. Another example is health care. Although 
National Health Insurance covers the entire population, the medical treatments that are 
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covered within National Health Insurance are still limited. The extension to those previously 
uncovered treatments will also cost a great deal of financing. 
Although the concept of ‘universal welfare state’ has yet to be clarified in 
Korea’s political discourse, it set the directions of social policy for the foreseeable future, as 
both major political parties have pushed forward the idea. They agree that the universal 
welfare state can be an effective response to ‘new social risks’ in Korea (Myles, 2002; Pang, 
2011; Kwon et al., 2010). Among these new social risks, the dramatic demographic transition 
to the ageing society poses the most serious threat. While in most OECD countries, the 
transition from an ageing to an aged society (the proportion of the elderly population from 
7% to 14%) took about 100 years, it should only take 19 years in Korea (from 2000 to 2019). 
With such demographic transition, it is seems clear that every citizen will need social 
protection at some point in life, either in the form of social services or social insurance. 
Political parties seem to agree that a ‘universal’ welfare state could be economically useful, 
as it could maintain Korean society’s productive potential. In the end, the Korean concept of 
welfare state remains closely tied to economic imperatives.    
 
Conclusion  
This chapter examined the changing meaning of the term ‘welfare state’ in Korea, contrasting 
its two different meanings: an embodiment of a ‘good society’ and an analytical term 
referring to specific institutions and policies. Originally, in the 1960s, the welfare state 
referred to an ideal state of affairs, when a small number of social programmes were 
introduced in the country as part of economic reform. Although a range of social insurance 
programmes had been subsequently implemented in Korea, the welfare state as an ideal 
remained an elusive goal in Korean society. It was only after new social programmes were 
introduced and existing ones were extended in the late 1990 that the welfare state as an 
analytical term became used by academics and policymakers to refer to a concrete set of 
social policies and institutions. Today, as a new social ideal, the ‘universal’ welfare state 
appears to set the goal for an ever-changing Korean society. Such fluctuating meaning of the 
welfare state is a reflection of the Korea’s transition from a poor to an affluent society, and 
the related development of social policy it brought about, in particular. Analytically speaking, 
this change constitutes a shift from a developmental welfare to a universal welfare state.  
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Despite this transformation, the paper has revealed that there has been a remarkable 
continuity in Korean society in the prevalence of the enduring belief that citizens should be 
guaranteed a decent standard of living. It is true that, in Korea, the recent emergence of the 
welfare agenda is due to increasing political competition in democratic politics. It is also true 
that demographic shifts and subsequent increases in ‘social risks’ have been among the main 
reasons for the support of the middle class towards a ‘universal’ welfare state. Nevertheless, 
democratic competition and the social shift towards post-industrialization are only part of the 
story. Such strong continuity can only be fully explained by Korea’s modernization project, 
which is about economic development, democracy and the welfare state. The idea of 
President Park Chung Hee that the ‘economy [should come] first and welfare [should come] 
later’, the notions of Kim Dae-jung’s ‘productive welfare’, and now the ‘universal welfare 
state’ all converge in principle with the belief that Korea should strive for the ‘welfare state’ 
as a good society. It is a fair observation that such consensus has not just been among 
policymakers but also among Korean people, throughout Korea’s economic transition.  
What is important in the present context is that the ‘universal’ welfare state is 
no longer an ideal state of affairs for the future. It is now knocking at the door. The Korean 
society is now faced with the immediate task of deciding what the ‘universal’ welfare state 
should be like. Who should be eligible for benefits? Who should pay for the ‘universal’ 
welfare state? How should the system be implemented? These are some of the questions 





Choe C. (1991) History of Korean Social Policy Research, Seoul: Korea Institute of Social S
ecurity (in Korean). 
Goodman R, White G and Kwon HJ. (1998) The East Asian Welfare Model: Welfare Orienta
lism and the State, London: Routledge. 
Haggard S and Moon CI. (1990) Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Cas
e Study. World Politics 42: 210-237. 
Jeong M. (2009) Debates on the Nature of the Welfare State in Korea II. Seoul: Human-bein
g and Welfare (In Korean). 
Kim Y-M. (2002) Debates on the Nature of the Welfare State in Korea. Seoul: Human-being
 & Welfare (In Korean). 
Ko I-d. (1990) Reform of the Public Assistance Programme and Policies for the Poor. In: K
DI (ed) National Expenditure and Policy Goals. Seoul: KDI (in Korean). 
Koh W. (2012) Analysis of Political Discourse on Welfare Agenda in Korea. Economy and S
ociety 95. 
Kwon HJ. (1999) The Welfare State in Korea: The Politics of Legitimation, London: Macmill
an. 
Kwon HJ. (2001) Globalization, Unemployment and Policy Responses in Korea: Respositionin
g the State? Global Social Policy 1: 213-234. 
Kwon HJ. (2005) Transforming the Developmental Welfare State in East Asia. London: UNRI
SD/Palgrave. 
Kwon HJ, Dong G and Moon H-g. (2010) Economic Crises and the Welfare State in Korea: 
Reforms and Future Challenges. Korea Journal of Policy Studies 24. 
Ministry of Labour. (1981) Fifteen Year History of Industrial Accident Insurance, Seoul: Mini
stry of Labour, Korea (in Korean). 
Myles J. (2002) A New Social Contract for the Elderly? In: Esping-Andersen G (ed) Why we
 need a New Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 130-172. 
Pang H. (2011) Forced Choiec: Retirement from the job for life and reemployment. Korean S
ociology 45. 
Park CH. (1962) Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction, Seoul: Hollym. 
Park CH. (1963) The Country, Revolution and I, Seoul: Hollym. 
Presidential Office. (2000) DJ Welfarism: A New Paradigm for Productive Welfare in Korea, 
Seoul: Presidential Office. 
Seo Ba. (1962) The Pledges of the 5.16 Military Revoulution and the Idea of the Welfare St
ate. Supreme Council Review 9 (in Korean). 
Seong K. (2002) Democratic consolidation and the development of the welfare state: Compari
son between Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-ju government. In: Kim Y-M (ed) Debat
es on the Nature of the Welfare State in Korea. Seoul: Human-being & Welfare (in 
Korean). 
Son J. (1981) A Study of the Policy Process of Social Policy Making in Korea. Department 
of Political Science. Seoul: Seoul National University. 
Woo M. (2008) Industrial Accident Insurance. In: Yang J (ed) Social Policy Making Process 
in Korea. Seoul: Nanam (in Korean). 
 
 
 
